Since Kvanvig claims that the coherence-making relationships that are traditionally construed as necessary for justification on a coherentist picture are the very relations that one grasps (for example, the objects of grasping) when one understands, the justification literature may be a promising place to begin. ), The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. A second reason that adverting to grasping-talk in the service of characterizing understanding raises further question is that it is often not clarified just what relationships or connections are being grasped, when they are grasped in a way that is distinctive of understanding. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. In particular, as Pritchard suggests, we might want to consider that agents working with the ideal gas law or other idealizations do not necessarily have false beliefs as a result, even if the content of the proposition expressed by the law is not strictly true. . 1pt1): pp. It seems as though understanding would possibly be undermined in a case where someone relying on the ideal gas law failed to appreciate it as an idealization. For one thing, it is prudent to note up front that there are uses of understanding that, while important more generally in philosophy, fall outside the purview of mainstream epistemology. Lipton, P. Understanding Without Explanation in H. de Regt, S. Leonelli, and K. Eigner (eds. To borrow a case from Riggs, stealing an Olympic medal or otherwise cheating to attain it lacks the kind of value one associates with earning the medal, through ones own skill. Grimm, S. Understanding In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. Van Camp, W. Explaining Understanding (or Understanding Explanation. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(1) (2014): 95-114. Bradford, G. Achievement. This is because Stella lacks beliefs on the matter, even though the students can gain understanding from her. Elgin (2007), like Zagzebski, is sympathetic to a weak factivity constraint on objectual understanding, where the object of understanding is construed as a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information (2007: 35). ), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. (2007: 37-8). Kepler improved on Copernicus by contending that the Earths orbit is not circular, but elliptical. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge. Synthese 191 (2014): 945-959. Positivism follows an identical approach as the study of natural sciences in the testing of a theory. He leaves grasping at the level of metaphor or uses it them literally but never develops it. Hetherington, S. There Can be Lucky Knowledge in M. Steup, J. Turri and E. Sosa (eds. See, however, Carter & Gordon (2014) for a recent criticism on the point of identifying understanding with strong cognitive achievement. Your paper should be 3-4 pages in length, not counting the Title page and Reference page. For example, in Whitcomb (2011) we find the suggestion that theoretical wisdom is a form of particularly deep understanding. Hempel, C. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Just as we draw a distinction between this epistemic state (that is, intelligibility, or what Grimm calls subjective understanding) and understanding (which has a much stricter factivity requirement), it makes sense to draw a line between grasping* and grasping where one is factive and the other is not. Pritchards (2010) account of the distinctive value of understanding is, in short, that understanding essentially involves a strong kind of finally valuable cognitive achievement, and secondly, that while knowledge comes apart from cognitive achievement in both directions, understanding does not. Carter, J. Kvanvig, J. Is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so forth? Much of the philosophical tradition has viewed the central epistemological problems concerning perception largely and sometimes exclusively in terms of the metaphysical responses to skepticism. Morris (2012), like Rohwer, also defends lucky understandingin particular, understanding-why, or what he calls explanatory understanding). Abstract. (For example, propositions, systems, bodies of information, the relationships thereof, and so on?). Strevens (2013) focuses on scientific understanding in his discussion of grasping. That said, Hills adds some qualifications. Where is the Understanding? Synthese, 2015. For example, when the issue is understanding mathematics, as opposed to understanding why 22=4, it is perhaps less obvious that dependence has a central role to play. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. Relatedly, Van Camp (2014) calls understanding a higher level cognition that involves recognizing connections between different pieces of knowledge, and Kosso (2007: 1) submits that inter-theoretic coherence is the hallmark of understanding, stating knowledge of many facts does not amount to understanding unless one also has a sense of how the facts fit together. While such remarks are made with objectual understanding (that is, understanding of a subject matter) in mind, there are similar comments about understanding-why (for example, Hills 2009) that suggest an overlapping need to consider connections between items of information, albeit on a smaller scale. Many of these questions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. Discusses the connection between curiosity and true belief. Would this impede ones understanding? In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. The proponent of moderate factivity owes an explanation. To this end, the first section offers an overview of the different types of understanding discussed in the literature, though their features are gradually explored in more depth throughout later sections. philos201 Assignment Details Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. See answer source: Epistemology in an Hour Caleb Beers Establishes a pro position, supporting that the shift in how people take in knowledge is good. More generally, as this line of criticism goes, sometimes we simply mistake mere (non-factive) intelligibility for understanding. A more sophisticated understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a common hominid ancestor (who was not, strictly speaking, an ape). In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. ), Justification and Knowledge. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. If, as robust virtue epistemologists have often insisted, cognitive achievement is finally valuable (that is, as an instance of achievements more generally), and understanding necessarily lines up with cognitive achievement but knowledge only sometimes does, then the result is a revisionary story about epistemic value. Carter, J. The Problem of the External World 2. 2015 Jun;21(3):433-9. doi: 10.1111/jep.12282. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. In order to illustrate this point, Kvanvig invites us to imagine a case where an individual reads a book on the Comanche tribe, and she thereby acquires a belief set about the Comanche. This skeptical argument is worth engaging with, presumably with the goal of showing that understanding does not turn out to be internally indistinguishable from mere intelligibility. Examines reasons to suppose that attributions of understanding are typically attributions of knowledge, understanding-why or objectual understanding. If the former, then this is unfortunate given the theoretical work the term is supposed to be doing in characterizing understanding. Making such an epistemological shift can then open up the possibility of communication with other-than-human persons in ways that few educational researchers seem able (or willing) to acknowledge (see Harvey, 2003). This is because we might be tempted to say instead that we desire to make sense of things because it is good to do so rather than saying that it is good to make sense of things because we desire it. Firstly, achievement is often defined as success that is because of ability (see, for example, Greco 2007), where the most sensible interpretation of this claim is to see the because as signifying a casual-explanatory relationshipthis is, at least, the dominant view. This view, embraced by DePaul and Grimm (2009), implies that to the extent that understanding and knowledge come apart, it is not with respect to a difference in susceptibility to being undermined by epistemic luck. Includes Alstons view of curiosity, according to which the epistemic value of true belief and knowledge partially comes from a link to curiosity. With a wide range of subtly different accounts of understanding (both objectual and understanding-why) on the table, it will be helpful to consider how understanding interfaces with certain key debates in epistemology. For A second variety of understanding that has generated interest amongst epistemologists is, understanding-why. Kvanvig does not spell out what grasping might involve, in the sense now under consideration, in his discussion of coherence, and the other remarks we considered above. Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. This is a change from the past. This consequence does not intuitively align with our practices of attributing understanding. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology. However, the core explanationist insight also offers the resources to supplement a grasping account. A. and Pritchard, D. Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck. Nos (2013). There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. More generally, though, it is important to note that Khalifa, via his grasping argument, is defending reliable explanatory evaluation as merely a necessarythough not sufficientcomponent of grasping. However, this concern might be abated with the addition of a moderate factivity constraint (for example, the constraint discussed in section two above) that rules out cases of mere intelligibility or subjective understanding). This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. His modal model of understanding fits with the intuition that we understand not propositions but relations between parts to wholes or systems of various thoughts.. Rohwers inventive move involves a contrast case featuring unifying understanding, that is, understanding that is furnished from multiple sources, some good and some bad. His central claim in his recent work is that understanding can be viewed as knowledge of causes, though appreciating how he is thinking of this takes some situating, given that the knowledge central to understanding is non-propositional. ), Fictions in Science: Essays on Idealization and Modeling. This entry surveys the varieties of cognitive success, and some recent efforts to understand some of those varieties. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift Epistemology refers to a dynamic concept that shows how humans understand knowledge, which entails how it is received, classified, justified, and transmitted in distinctive ways and at different periods in history. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. It should be noted that Hills 2009: 7 is also sympathetic to a similar thought, suggesting that the threshold for understanding might be contextually determined. Displacements of power in the realm of concepts accompany these new orientations. The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:3 (2010): 497-522. Grimm develops this original position via parity of reasoning, taking as a starting point that the debate about a priori knowledge, for example, knowledge of necessary truths, makes use of metaphors of grasping and seeing that are akin to the ones in the understanding debate. This is a view to which Grimm (2010) is also sympathetic, remarking that the object of objectual understanding can be profitably viewed along the lines of the object of know-how, where Grimm has in mind here an anti-intellectualist interpretation of know-how according to which knowing how to do something is a matter of possessing abilities rather than knowing facts (compare, Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). His alternative suggestion is to propose explanation as the ideal of understanding, a suggestion that has as a consequence that one should measure degrees of understanding according to how well one approximate[s] the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. Khalifa submits that this line is supported by the existence of a correct and reasonably good explanation in the background of all cases of understanding-why that does not involve knowledge of an explanationa background explanation that would, if known, provide a greater degree of understanding-why. endangered species in the boreal forest; etown high school basketball roster. A worry about this move can be put abstractly: consider that if understanding entails true beliefs of form , and that beliefs of form must themselves be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities, it might still be that ones reliable -generating abilities are exercised in a bad environment. Her line is that understanding-why involves (i) knowing what something is, and (ii) making reasonable sense of it. He also suggests that what epistemic agents want is not just to feel like they are making sense of things but to actually make sense of them. For one thing, abstract objects, such as mathematical truths and other atemporal phenomena, can plausibly be understood even though our understanding of them does not seem to require an appreciation of their coming to existence. Includes criticism of Kvanvigs line on epistemic luck and understanding. Alston, W. Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Pritchard maintains that it is intuitive that in the case just described understanding is attainedyou have consulted a genuine fire officer and have received all the true beliefs required for understanding why your house burned down, and acquire this understanding in the right way. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. Grimm, S. Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515-535. He argues that we can gain some traction on the nature of grasping significant to understanding if we view it along such manipulationist lines. Argues that understanding (unlike knowledge) is a type of cognitive achievement and therefore of distinctive value. Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution Pritchard (2007) has put forward some ideas that may prevent the need to adopt a weak view of understandings factivity while nonetheless maintaining the key thrust of Elgins insight. Argues against the view that moral understanding can be immune to luck while moral knowledge is not. For example: Although a moderate view of understandings factivity may look promising in comparison with competitor accounts, many important details remain left to be spelled out. For if the view is correct, then an explanation for why ones understanding why the painting is beautiful is richer, when it is, will simply be in terms of ones possession of a correct answer to the question of why it is beautiful. Nevertheless, distinguishing between the two in this manner raises some problems for her view of objectual understanding, which should be unsurprising given the aforementioned counterexamples that can be constructed against a non-factive reading of Bakers construal of understanding-why. Riaz, A. This view, while insisting that central beliefs must all be true, is flexible enough to accommodate that there are degrees of understandingthat is, that understanding varies not just according to numbers of true beliefs but also numbers of false, peripheral beliefs. However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Such a constraint would preserve the intuition that understanding is a particularly desirable epistemic good and would accordingly be untroubled by the issues highlighted for the weakest view outlined at the start of the section. Pritchard, D. Knowledge and Understanding in A. Fairweather (ed. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. Utilize at least 2 credible sources to support your position presented in the paper. ), Knowledge, Virtue and Action. Goldman, A. 115, No. epistemological shift pros and cons. It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that humans did not evolve. Keplers theory is a further advance in understanding, and the current theory is yet a further advance. Introduces intelligibility as an epistemic state similar to understanding but less valuable. Resists Pritchards claim that there can be weak achievements, that is, ones that do not necessarily involve great effort. There is debate about both (i) whether understanding-why might fairly be called explanatory understanding and (ii) how understanding-why might differ from propositional knowledge. Contains exploration of whether the value knowledge may be in part determined by the extent to which it provides answers to questions one is curious about. Hence, he argues that any propositional knowledge is derivative. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay. Attempts to explain away the intuitions suggesting that lucky understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck.

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